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The Armenian population in the Caucasus outside Armenia proper, lives mainly in the Samtshe-Javakheti1 province in  Southwest Georgia and in the Krasnodar region of the Russian  Federation situated in the Northwest Caucasus – not counting Nagorno-Karabakh. In our day, Javakheti and Adler, situated in the aforementioned two regions, have a predominantly Armenian population that is seeking cultural and political autonomy. Considering the Armenians’ way of gradually driving away the other  peoples from the places they settle in, aiming to have a mono-ethnic structure, and Armenia’s aspiration to gain access to  the coast of the Black Sea, a study of the past and present of the  Samtshe-Javakheti and the Krasnodar Armenians – the latter also  known as Amshen or Hemshin Armenians – will give clues as to the  future of their quest for autonomy-independence.
There are a number of factors which make the developments taking place along Turkey’s Northwestern borders all the more  important for Ankara strategically. Some of these factors involve  the Samtshe-Javakheti region:
1.	The Samtshe-Javakheti province is adjacent to the Turkish province of Ardahan.2 
2.	The Turkgozu (Posof) border gate – as well as the planned Aktas  (Cildir) border gate – is on that province’s border with Turkey.
3.	The Eurasian Transportation Corridor, the Baku-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipe Line and the Kars-Tbilisi Railway projects will all pass through that province.
4.	That province is the homeland of the  Ahiska Turks and the possibility of their return there from the  places where they have been resettled, is on the agenda.
Other factors involve the Russian Federation’s Krasnodar region:
1.	Krasnodar accounts for the Russian Federation’s entire Black Sea coastal strip. 
2.	Krasnodar is the Russian equivalent of Turkey’s agricultural​ly, industrially and commercially developed Marmara  region.
3.	Two major Black Sea ports such as Novorossysk and Sochi are in that region.
4.	The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is  active in that region where the Kurds seek autonomy.
5.	The Adigey Federated Republic, with which Turkey has a close relationship, is  an enclave situated in that region.
6.	The Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipe Line’s itinerary is through that region.





Georgia, one of the three independent countries in Southern Caucasus, constitutes a gate or bridge between the East and the West, having a common border with Turkey, Russia and Azerbaijan as well as a Black Sea coastline. It is also in the convergence point of the Christian and Muslim worlds. After Georgia gained independence, Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia came to be sensitive  issues for Georgian security and independence. And, as of 1999,  Georgia’s border area with Chechnya became another sensitive spot  for the country’s security along with the Southwestern Georgia  which has a predominantly Armenian population.

In today’s Georgia, Armenians are the second biggest ethnic  group after Georgians. They live mostly in Southwestern Georgia and in Tbilisi. Prior to the 1877-78 war between the Ottoman state  and Tzarist Russia – known as the War of 93 in Turkey – Armenians lived mostly in cities, especially in Tbilisi, working  as traders and craftsmen. However, in the aftermath of the 1877-78 war, that is, during the reign of Tzar Nicholas I, Russia seized Southwest Caucasia (Abkhazia, Adzharia, Ahiska-Meskheti3 and  Javakheti). And, as a result of Russia’s ethnic cleansing policy  the Muslim peoples of the Russian-occupied Southwest Caucasus  (Turks, Abkhazians, Adzhars etc.) migrated to the Ottoman lands.  Meanwhile, some of the Armenians living inside the borders of the  Ottoman state migrated to Southwest Caucasus to benefit from the  fact that that region was being evacuated. Thus, through these population movements, voluntary or forced, that occurred in the  first half of the XIX th Century, the foundations of the current ethnic fabric of Southwest Caucasia were laid and an Armenian  population came to flourish in Georgia’s rural parts as well. 
During the time of the Tzarist Russia, Georgia consisted of two administrative regions (guberniyas): Tbilisi and Kutaisi. According to Guretski, the results of the 1897 census indicated  that the Armenians accounted for 18.7 percent of the population in the overall Tbilisi administrative region, 25 percent in the Tbilisi province and 75 percent in the Tbilisi city. In the late  XIX th Century, that is, before Baku’s oil-driven development  began, Tbilisi was the leading commercial, industrial and cultural center in Southwestern Caucasus. And Tbilisi’s entrepreneurs, the traders who engaged in wholesale and retail trade, were the Armenians who were also making a contribution to the capital city’s cultural life. The 1897 census indicated that Armenians  accounted for 9.2 percent of the total population in the entire 





(On a province, autonomous region basis/2000)

Towards the end of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia (1989), the Javakheti province consisted of two counties, namely, Ahalkelek5 and Ninotsminda (formerly known as Bogdanovka), and the Meskheti province consisted of four counties, namely, Akhalsikhe, Adigeni, Aspindza and Borzhomi. In the 1990s the region’s ethnic composition changed in favor of the Armenians when a great part of the Duhobor and Molokan Russians who had migrated to Southern Caucasus in the XIX th Century and who lived in the especially in  those parts of the Ninotsminda county that are situated near the Armenian border, migrated to Russia and Canada.6 Thus Javakheti has become a province where 91.3 percent of the population is Armenian. And, in the Meskheti province, 1/3 percent of the population is Armenian. After Georgia became independent a great majority of the Russians and, in the wake of the Georgian-Ossetian fighting, 700 Ossetians, left Meskheti. In Borzhomi there is a smaller Armenian population than in Akhalsikhe. If we take up the Javakheti and Meskheti provinces together, the Armenian community accounts for 40 percent of the total population in these two provinces.7


The Question of Ahiska Turks’ Return to Their Homeland

One of the main factors speeding up the “Armenianization” of the Southwest Georgia was the banishment to Central Asia – mostly to Uzbekistan – of the 115,000 Ahiska Turks8 who had been living in 220 villages in Javakheti and most intensively in the Meskheti provinces of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia.9 Later the Soviet officials did not permit the Ahiska Turks – according to the 1989 census a total 207,000 Ahiska Turks lived in the entire Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – to return to their homeland.10 During the USSR era, the Ahiska Turks – whose consciousness of a national identity began to raise in the 1950s – were not able to return to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia except on an “individual” basis or to visit the country as a tourist. During the Zviad Gamsakhurdia period the Georgian government gave the Ahiska Turks two options: They could reside in Georgia under Georgian identity or settle in some other part of the country rather than in the Meskheti province. The Gamsakhurdia government’s offer was, in fact, part of the policy of “Georgianization of Georgia”.11 However, the current officials of Georgia believe that this is a good time to solve the problem of the Ahiska Turks – that make up a 368,000 -strong group.12 In line with a decree issued by President E. Schevardnadze in July 1996, a commission was formed to look into the Ahiska Turks issue. Georgia’s National Security Minister Shota Kviraya said that the Turks’ return to the region bordering on Turkey and Armenia, was giving Georgia the opportunity to use the “Meskhetian” (Ahiskan) card in Caucasia – a region of strategic importance.13 Georgia – preparing to use in the 2000s the “Ahiskan” card, that is, the “Muslim Georgians” against the Armenians in Georgia - has not, despite the Turkish expectations, abandoned its plan to “Georgianize” the Ahiska Turks along with the other ethnic groups. A meeting held in Georgia-Gudauri on Sept. 9-11, 2000 under the auspices of the European Commission, discussed the “Return of Ahiska Turks to Georgia Gradually in 12 Years” plan which had been presented to Georgia by the Council of Europe in the framework of Georgia’s becoming a Council of Europe member on Jan. 25, 1999. During the meeting Guram Mamulya, head of the Georgian Rehabilitation of the Refugees Agency, insisted that those returning to Georgia should adopt “Georgian names and surnames and Georgian identity.” This gives a clue as to how Georgia will interpret and implement the return plan in question which is expected to be approved by the Georgian government.14
After the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey became increasingly more sensitive to the plight of the Ahiska Turks in the 1990s. With the “Law for the Acceptance into Turkey and Resettlement of the Ahiska Turks” passed in 1992, Turkey agreed not only to the resettlement in Turkey of the Ahiska Turks but also granted dual citizenship to those Ahiska Turks who would remain in the newly-independent former Soviet republics.15 This law gave a new impetus to the migration to Turkey of the Ahiska Turks, whose main aim was migrating to Turkey rather than returning to their homeland in Georgia. And the former Soviet Republics where they were living, supported that migration wave. A string of Turkish governments have failed over the past ten years to conduct a substantial policy which could change the direction of the Ahiska Turks’ migration – towards Georgia. This de facto situation is giving relief to the Javakheti Armenians.16


The organizations of the Georgian Armenians: 
‘Javak Movement’, ‘Parvents’, ‘Virk’ 







During the time of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, the Ahalkelek and Ninotsminda counties made up the Javakheti province and the Akhalsikhe, Adigeni, Aspindza and Borzhomi counties made up the Meskheti province. In 1994 these two provinces – which were the Ahiska Turks’ homeland – were merged into a single province called Samtshe-Javakheti province. Before Tbilisi reached a deal by making certain concessions, the Samtshe-Javakheti province was being governed by the Provisional House of Representatives. Under the agreement reached between the Ahalkelek Town Assembly Secretary Karahanyan and the Javak movement, the House of Representatives was to “fill the political void” created by the Javakheti Armenians’ rejection of the governors appointed by the Tbilisi administration. Thus, in February 1991, the 24-member House of Representatives was formed by the representatives elected by the 64 villages apart from the eight representatives elected by the Ahalkelek county seat. The House of Representatives had a seven-member chairmanship council. After President Gamsakhurdia – who conducted erroneous policies involving the minorities, categorizing the people as the “hosts” and the “guests” – announced during a visit to Akhalsikhe that the Armenians were “guests” in Georgia, The Javak-controlled House of Representatives voted on a motion declaring Javakheti’s independence but the motion was killed with the votes of more than half of the House of Representatives members.20 
On March 10, 1992 Georgia’s Military Council was transformed into the Council of State led by E. Schevardnadze. Under Schevardnadze’s rule the Javakheti Armenians continued to distance themselves from the Tbilisi administration. In 1994 especially incidents broke out when a new governor was appointed to Ahalkelek. Thus, during the period in question, the region lived independent of the Tbilisi on a de facto basis.21 In 1994 in line with the presidential decree No. 237, the institution of State Representatives Board was introduced in the provinces to ensure order in the post-Soviet system. On the basis of that decree the Meskheti and Javakheti provinces, where the Armenians live, were merged to create the Samtshe-Javakheti province, and Gigla Baramidze was appointed provincial governor.22 The decision to merge the two provinces may have stemmed from a desire to reduce the concentration of the Armenian population in Javakheti. On the other hand, it is a fact that the merger has expanded the scope of the Armenians’ autonomy and/or independence demands – which had been limited to Javakheti in the past. Since Georgia became independent a quarrel has been underway in re the state model between those advocating reinforcement of the central authority (centralists) and those demanding a federative structure (federalists). The great majority of the centralists agree to a federative structure provided that this will be limited to Adzharia and Abkhazia and, for some of them, to South Ossetia. On the other hand, the centralists are concerned over the possibility that if Georgia is given a federative structure this will encourage the quest for autonomy of the minorities – Migrels, Svans, and mostly, the Javakheti Armenians and the Marneuli Azeris – and thus lead to the disintegration of the country. The federalists, on the other hand, argue that 70 percent of the country’s population is Georgian, and that the proposed new system would not pose a big threat since the minorities live together in specific areas. While the debate between the centralists and the federalists continue, in September 1997 E. Schevardnadze charged M. Areshidze, who supports federalism, with the task of drafting a bill on the minorities.23
The Dashnaksutun Party (known in Turkey as Tashnak) was founded in Tbilisi in 1890. After the Bolshevik revolution it focused on activities outside the USSR, intensifying its influence over the Armenian diaspora. The Dashnaksutun Party’s program on a possible annexation of Javakheti to Armenia, says: “The Sevres Treaty of Dec. 10, 1920, determined the Armenian lands. According to that agreement Nakhichevan, Ahalkelek and Karabakh regions are parts of the unified Armenia.” The pro-Dashnak circles had won a victory at the Javak congress held in 1996. In 1997, partly because of the influence exerted by the Javak’s radical wing, which gained strength after that congress, the Javak movement began collecting signatures for a communique despite the pressure put on it by the Georgian police. The communique, which began with the words, “Esteemed people of Javak”, argued that the creation of the Samtshe-Javakheti was unconstitutional and called for insertion of an “app​rop​riate status for Javakheti” clause into that part of the Constitution which sets the guidelines for the country’s administrative structure. A total 30,000 people signed the communique in Ahalkelek county and 12,000 in Ninotsminda county by the beginning of September 1997. Though the Javak movement is making “mild” demands such as cultural autonomy, there is ample evidence indicating that the Par​vents,24 which is a paramilitary organization, has other plans for Javakheti’s future.25
The Javakheti Armenians, who at present have all the elements of cultural autonomy on a de facto basis, do not know the Georgian language. The Georgians living in that province, on the other hand, can speak the Armenian language fluently. The great majority of the children in the region attend Armenian schools. The Georgian Education Ministry officially approves the teaching of Armenian history at schools in Javakheti. Furthermore, under an agreement reached with Armenia, school books come from Yerevan. The students in that province later attend the universities in Yerevan or the Armenian Language and Literature Faculty of the Tbilisi Pedagogical Institute or the Yerevan University’s Ninotsminda-based faculty. The inhabitants of Ahalkelek watch the Armenian TV and read the Javakheti newspaper which appears irregularly. Schevardnadze and Ter-Petrosyan met in Javakheti in 1997. The official communique issued at the end of the meeting said that the Armenians’ cultural autonomy rights would be taken into conside​ration and that the Armenian national schools would be treated with tolerance. Also, Levon Ter-Petrosyan announced that Yerevan would not support any attempt to destabilize Javakheti and he had the Dashnaks’ Lragir newspaper –which had published a series of articles on a potential annexation of Samtshe-Javakheti by Armenia– closed. In 1998 political analysts wrote that the government change in Armenia would further complicate the situation in Javakheti.26 Yet the new Armenian government’s policy involving Georgia does not seem to be any different than that of its predecessor. Surrounded by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia considers it more important strategically to maintain good relations with Georgia than compromising these relations by acquiring a mountainous region. 
Though Armenia is refraining from debating the Javakheti issue the Javakheti Armenians’ quest for autonomy is continuing. And the pro-Dashnak Virk Organization is now leading the social movement in that direction. In fact, on April 3, 2000, that is, prior to the April 9, 2000 presidential election, some 200 Javakheti Armenians organized by Virk gathered in front of the Ahalkelek governor’s office, protested Schevardnadze, and staged an “egg-throwing attack.” Following the incident Virk leader David Vekilyan announced that they will seek support from the “countries of the world” to ensure that Javakheti will be given an autonomous status.27
After creating the Samtshe-Javakheti province the Georgian authorities failed to formulate a clear cut policy as to what could be done in the region. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Tbilisi administration, which wants to create a Muslim Georgian population from the Ahiska Turks, would like to make the inhabitants of Southwest Georgia too to adopt Georgian language and identity. As if to confirm this conviction, Governor of the Samtshe-Javakheti province G. Baramidze announced during a meeting he held with the local leaders on June 15, 2000 that all civil servants in the province must learn the Georgian language adequately in three years.28 


The Importance of the Ahalkelek Russian Base for the Javakheti Armenians 

There are, at the Ahalkelek 62nd (Russian) Military Base, 1,964 military personnel, 41 main combat tanks, 114 “BMP and BTR” armored communications vehicles/armored personnel carriers, 46 military vehicles of various sizes, 61 artillery systems and two vehicles for construction of pontoon bridges. Also stationed within the base are the 409th and 412th Mechanized Regiments, the 817th Artillery Battalion, the 889th Communications Battalion and the 65th Artillery Detachment.29
The Ahalkelek base is the biggest source of employment in Javakheti. More than half of the base personnel are of Javakheti Armenian origin – of whom 70-90 percent are, at the same time, nationals of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, a significant part of the population in the province earns a living by doing business with the Russian army.30 For the Javakheti Armenians the base in question has great significance not only from the economic standpoint but also from the security angle. The base is being seen as a bulwark against Turkey and Georgia. The Javakheti Armenians are convinced that the base could, when required, arm the Armenians – as in the Nagorno-Karabakh war – and provide protection against potential internal or external attacks. The Georgian army, on the other hand, has not even been deployed in the province.31 Irakli Batiashvili, former head of the Georgian National Security Organization, has claimed that during the 1994-1996 period the mechanized units at the Ahalkelek Russian Base helped transport arms from Georgia to Armenia.32 
While the Javakheti Armenians are happy about it, Georgia is not happy at all about the Russian military presence which it perceives as a threat to its independence. Georgia has demanded that Russia withdraw its military presence, starting with Vaziani and Gudauta. In fact, the joint communique issued by the Russian Federation and Georgia during the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit meeting held in Istanbul on Nov. 17, 1999, announced the decision for Russia to reduce its military presence in Georgia to a maximum 153 tanks, 241 armored military vehicles and 140 artillery guns by Dec. 31, 2000; to evacuate the Vaziani and Gudauta Russian military bases and the Tbilisi 142nd Tank Repair Base by Dec. 31, 2000, to close down the Vaziani and Gudauta military bases by July 1, 2001 and for the two sides to reach a decision about the Batumi and Ahalkelek Russian military bases by the end of 2000.33
Samtshe-Javakheti’s economy

Samtshe-Javakheti province has, among the provinces of Georgia, the worst economy, infrastructure, communication lines and roads, the lowest living standard and the highest unemployment rate. This is a province where privatization has not begun. The collective farms called Kolkhoz have gone bankrupt and agricultural production has faltered. The few industrial plants are in an unusable state. Due to these reasons Samtshe-Javakheti’s economy has become dependent on Russia and Turkey over the past ten years. At present a large part of the people living in the province are small farmers who conduct “suitcase trade” with Turkey. In addition to the suitcase trade there are some other job opportunities. There is the Ahalkelek Russian Base. Of the total number of people with jobs in the province, 20 percent works for the local cannery. The sale of oil to Armenia and the quarrying and sale of marble, basalt and construction stones – which are allegedly being exported to Turkey – too provide job opportunities. Also, there are those work for small-scale industrial plants, stores and bakeries. 
Due to the high unemployment rate a large-scale migration is taking place from the region mostly to the Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov regions of the Russian Federation and to the United States.34 In Javakheti, Armenistan’s Dram and the Russian Federation’s Rouble – since the personnel of the Ahalkelek Russian Base use the Rouble – are in circulation along with Georgia’s Lari. In the province, the private businesses, stores especially, prefer the Rouble. For this reason, to ensure that people, especially the personnel at the Russian bases – will use the Lari, the Georgian president’s office issued the Decree No. 348 in the summer of 1997 specifying that “within the national borders Lari is the legal unit of payment.” Later, special commissions were founded to ensure the use of Lari in the Samtshe-Javakheti and (predominantly Azeri) Kverno-Kartli provinces.35


The Krasnodar (Amshen) Armenians 

Outside Armenia proper, Armenians live in large concentrations in the Caucasus, not only in Nagorno-Karabakh and Samtshe-Javakheti but also in Krasnodar. 
The Krasnodar state, which comprises the Russian Federation’s entire Black Sea coastal strip, boasting two major Black Sea port cities, Novorosyssk and Sochi, is the Russian equivalent of Turkey’s agriculturally, industrially and commercially developed Marmara region. A region with moderate climate and fertile lands, Krasnodar is one of the regions in Russia that attract the highest number of migrants.36 Since the dissolution of the USSR half a million people have migrated into Krasnodar. Currently 78 ethnic groups live in the region. Armenians top the list of the people migrating into the Krasnodar. Since the Armenians living in the Black Sea regions of Russia and Abkhazia are mostly of Hemshin origin (Hemshin is an area in Turkey’s Eastern Black Sea region), they have come to be called “Amshen Armenians” in Northern Caucasus.37 Since the time of the USSR, there has been an intense movement of Armenian migrant workers into the Krasnodar state from both Armenia and Southwestern Georgia. Furthermore, due to the Georgian-Abkhazian war, Abkhazian Georgians and Armenians – reportedly amounting to some 40 percent of the total population of Abkhazia – migrated to Krasnodar in 1992.38 Thus, by now, the Armenians have become the second-biggest ethnic group in Krasnodar after the Russians. In order to regulate the Armenian migration into Krasnodar the Russian Federation signed a “Resettlement of Voluntary Migrants” agreement with Armenia in 1997. However, this agreement failed to regulate the Armenian migration. In fact it led to a further increase in the number of Armenians migrating into Krasnodar. For this reason the Russian Federation’s Federal Assembly has postponed the ratification of the agreement.39
The Amshen Armenians have become organized in those cities and villages in Krasnodar with a predominantly Amshen Armenian population and developed their relations with the Armenian diaspora. The most important Armenian establishment in Krasnodar is the “Armenian Science and Culture Center” called “Amshen.” The center in question was founded by the Amshen Armenians living in Krasnodar’s Tuapse and Apsheron counties. This center was founded to provide information to the Amshen Armenians about the activities of the Armenian establishments of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora and, at the same time, relaying news about the Amshen Armenians to the Russian, Armenian, and Armenian diaspora press. The center publishes a newspaper named “Yerkramas.”40 Tigran Tavadyan, the editor-in-chief of that newspaper, is, at the same time, the elected chairman of the center and serves as spokesman for the Amshen Armenians.41






The Krasnodar State (Russian Federation-Northwestern Caucasus/2000)

While Ankara seems to be still in the dark, Moscow has been well aware of the developments taking place in Krasnodar. The administrators of Krasnodar – a region which, with its economy and local administrative structure, is more nationalistic and conservative than the other administrative units in Russia – and the Slavic Kazakhs (Cossacks) are being increasingly upset by the Armenian claims on Krasnodar and the way the Armenian population in the Krasnodar state keeps growing.46 Since communist-nationalist Nikolay Kondratenko was elected governor of Krasnodar in 1996 the nationalistic line of the Krasnodar administration has become more pronounced. Kondratenko is hostile towards all peoples, especially towards Jews, with the exception of the Cossacks and the local  Russians, and is considered a “xenocrat”.47 AKCA, the Cossacks’ paramilitary organization which has 3,500 active members, has adopted the same policy with Kondratenko. In fact, the tension which has continually increased since 1996 has caused skirmishes between Armenian and Cossack youths from time to time.48 
Speaking at a meeting on “Krasnodar state’s international relations and the conditions for being accepted as immigrants” in June 2000, Deputy Governor Krasnodar Nikolay Karchenko focused on the Krasnodar Armenians, saying that “the Armenians see Kuban as their historical homeland, that for that reason there has been a systematic Armenian migration into that state, that the Armenians have become the second-biggest ethnic group in the state accounting for 38 percent of Krasnodar’s population49, that the immigrants are forming colonies along the Black Sea coast, that in Sochi where the ethnic-demographic structure has been rapidly altered in the Armenians’ favor the Armenian population has doubled in recent years, that some of the executives of the Sochi-based Armenian nongovernmental organizations have relations with the Armenian terrorist organizations, that the aims of these nongovernmental organizations is to create an ‘Armenian National Zone’ in Adler, and that this has created an ‘Armenian problem’ in Sochi.”50
The “Amshen” members who gathered at Novomihaylovski, avillage in Krasnodar’s Tuapse county, on July 15, 2000, claimed that Krasnodar Governor N. Kondratenko and his aides were inciting the Cossacks to trigger clashes between the Cossacks and the Armenians, and, on July 21, 2000, expressing the hope that Krasnodar will not be a region of clashes such as Chechnya, Crimea and Abkhazia, they filed a complaint with Putin against the local administrators of Krasnodar.51 Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation’s Ethnic Organizations Congress Antuan Arakelianda, whom the Congress has chosen as Russia’s Human Rights Envoy, held a press conference in Yerevan on July 19, 2000 and accused Krasnador’s local administrators – starting with Governor Kondratenko – of encouraging negative actions against the Caucasian peoples and of creating ethnic tension in Krasnodar. He said that the Armenians living in that province no longer knew who was to preserve and implement the laws.52





The Samtshe-Javakheti and Krasnodar, which Turkey perceives as “distant lands situated near Turkey” are pregnant with new incidents due to the multidimensional Armenian problem which has become increasingly prominent over the past ten years. 
Since it gained independence Georgia has become a potential “corridor” for both the energy and transportation routes extending from the East to the West. The Nagorno-Karabakh War has made Georgia all the more important in this respect. Armenia has gained access to Russia and to the West via Georgia. Turkey has gained access to Azerbaijan via Georgia. And Turkey and Azerbaijan have begun conducting their unregistered commerce and tourism activities with Armenia via Georgia. Georgia is aware of the fact that if, in the wake of the clashes in its Northern and Northwestern regions, that is, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a fresh ethnic clash breaks out, this time in the Southwestern part of the country, that is, in Samtshe-Javakheti, this may lead to a permanent fragmentation of Georgia. 
Schevardnadze is trying to carry out his foreign policy by establishing a balance between two groups of states: with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and the western countries on one hand and Russia, Armenia and some other countries on the other hand. The EU and France have reached an agreement with Georgia and Armenia for reconstruction of the Poti-Hashuri-Borzhomi-Akhalsikhe-Gyumri-Yerevan-Megri highway between Georgia and Armenia. In 1996 Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine signed an agreement to design and implement – in close cooperation with Uzbekistan – a project for creation of a “transportation corridor” linking Tashkent-Baku-Kiev, a project which later came to be known as the “Eurasia transportation corridor.” The agreement in question formed the nucleus of GUUAM.55 Construction of the Eurasian transportation corridor, the Baku-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipe Line Project which Turkey keeps on the agenda, and the Kars-Tbilisi Railway Project56, are initiatives which could reduce the Russian influence in Southern Caucasus.57 For this reason, there is the possibility of Russia triggering and/or supporting a clash in the Samtshe-Javakheti province which is on the itinerary of the energy and transportation corridors in question, a clash which would cause these projects to be shelved indefinitely. Such a clash would, at the same time, indicate the need in the region for the presence of the Ahalkelek Russian Base, and thus bolster the base’s current status. 
Yerevan, which does not have diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, has two neighbors with whom it has established diplomatic relations: Iran and Georgia. Yerevan is not supporting the separatist movements in Georgia so as not to disrupt its relations with Georgia – the gateway through which it gains access to Russia, to the West and to the Black Sea. With long-term thinking, Yerevan feels happier about the newly-created Samtshe-Javakheti province – which was created by merging the Meskheti and Javakheti provinces after Georgia became independent – than it had about the Javakheti province which existed during the time of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. This is because this new province is adjacent to Adzharia – which is situated on the Black Sea coast and has good relations with both Yerevan and Moscow. Thus, Yerevan has come one step closer to its ideal of reaching the Black Sea. 
Furthermore, Armenia and the Javakheti Armenians use the Sarp (Artvin-Hopa) border gate – which provides access to Adzharia – and the Turkgozu (Ardahan-Posof) border gate – which provides access to the Samtshe-Javakheti province – in their trade with Turkey (especially with Turkey’s Eastern Black Sea region). Armenia and the Javakheti Armenians will get greater relief with the  opening of the planned Aktas (Ardahan-Cildir) border gate towards the Georgian province in question, Aktas being situated nearer to Armenia than the Sarp and Turgozu border gates. Thus, Turkey, while trying to cultivate better relations with Georgia, will indirectly be helping Armenia and the Javakheti Armenians.58
And the fact that the Ahiska Turks, a natural part of the Anatolian Turkish entity, may be able to return to Samtshe-Javakheti, is a factor which can affect the province’s future. If the Schevardnadze administration, which has been trying to have the Russian bases in Georgia closed down, uses the Ahiska Turks card to balance the Armenians, new incidents will be likely to break out in Southwestern Georgia. And if Turkey continues to resettle in Anatolia the Ahiska Turks, this will give relief to the Samtshe-Javakheti Armenians and Krasnodar’s local administrators. In fact, Krasnodar’s local administrators have adopted a policy of “discreetly implementing in stages a plan aimed at upsetting the Ahiska Turks living in that province – which has strategic importance for Russia – and making them migrate to Turkey.59






1.	In some articles written in Turkish “Javakheti” is referred to as “Cevaheti” or, due to the influence of translations made from Russian, as “Javahetia”.
2.	Situated on the Georgian side of the Turkish-Georgian border are the Adzharia Autonomous Republic and the Samtshe-Javakheti province and, on the Turkish side of the border, the Artvin and Ardahan provinces. The Adigeni, Akhalsikhe, Aspindza and Ahalkelek counties of the Samtshe-Javakheti province are adjacent to Turkey, that is, to the Ardahan province.
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39.	Relayed from the Yerkramas newspaper (Krasnodar) by MEDIAMAX, June 23, 2000, Yerevan. (http: // racoon.riga.lv/ minelres/ archive/ 02181999-22:36::51-9764.html).
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48.	In the villages of Anapa there have been skirmishes continually between the Cossack and Armenian youths. Relayed from Yerkramas (Krasnodar) newspaper by MEDIAMAX, June 6, 2000, Yerevan.
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Щасан КАНБОЛАТ (АСАМ, Анкара, Тцркийя)
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Бу эцн Ермянистан вя Даьлыг Гарабаь хариъиндя, Гафгазда ермяниляр компакт щалда ики йердя – Эцръцстанын Самтсе-Ъавахети вилайятиндя вя Русийа Федерасийасынын Краснодар вилайятиндя йашайырлар. Ермянилярин  мяскунлашдыглары щяр бир йердян диэяр миллятляри тядриъян сыхышдырыб чыхармагла етник монотонлуг йаратмаг хцсусиййятини вя онларын Гара Дянизя  гядяр узанан бир Ермянистан дювляти гурмаг истяйини консептуал вя практики сявиййядя тядгиг едян мцяллифляр йухарыда гейд олунан бюлэялярдя  ермянилярин милли мухтариййятя ъан атмасыны Гафгазын етно- вя эео-сийаси чярчивясиндя дяйярляндирирляр.
Мягалядя  Краснодар вя Ъавахетидя йашайан ермяни милли азлыьынын игтисади, сийаси вя сосиал щяйат шяртляри бцтцн инъяликлярийля арашдырылмыш, онларын милли мухтариййятя ъан атмасынын обйектив вя субйектив ясаслары изащ едилмишдир. Елми арашдырмалар нятиъясиндя мцяллифлярин эялдийи сон гянаят будур ки, гейд олунан бюлэялярдя йашайан ермянилярин мухтариййят арайышынын мядяни, сосиал вя игтисади сябябляринин ня олдуьундан асылы олмайараг, цмумиййятля, баш вермякдя олан ермяни сепаратчы щярякятляри Гафгазда вя Гафгаз цзяриндя эедян эео-сийаси ойунлар силсилясинин бир щиссясидир вя буна эюря дя, мящз бу чярчивядя яля алыныб тядгиг олунмалыдыр.
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